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I. INTRODUCTION
China's failure to enforce intellectual property rights has hindered its efforts
to increase its international trade.' Despite the fact that China's intellectual
property laws appear to be adequate in theory, piracy of copyrighted works and
I. See Joseph Kahn & Helene Cooper, China Plans to Cut Tariffs, End Quotas in Bid to Join Trade
Group, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at AI0 (reporting that China's increased efforts at enforcing intellectual
property rights are a big step toward gaining entry to the World Trade Organization); Amy E. Simpson,
Copyright Law and Software Regulations in the People's Republic of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected
World Trade?, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 575,579 n.20 (1995).
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trademarks has been rampant in China, and the Chinese government has failed to
live up to its obligations to enforce its own regulations under the 1992 U.S./China
Memorandum of Understanding on Intellectual Property Protection.2 Thus, there
is skepticism regarding China's recent promises to curtail infringements.3 How-
ever, China is motivated to intensify its intellectual property enforcement to avoid
a trade war with the United States.
4
The United States maintains its own reasons to encourage China's
enforcement of intellectual property rights.5 First, the U.S. government seeks to
reduce the losses U.S. companies suffer at the hands of Chinese pirates. Second,
it hopes to ensure that U.S. companies' significant efforts to develop the emer-
ging Chinese markets are properly rewarded, thereby expanding the markets for
U.S. goods.
6
In an effort to increase Chinese protection of intellectual property rights and
preclude an impending trade war, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and
People's Republic of China Minister of Foreign Trade Wu Yi announced on
February 26, 1995 the signing of the Accord on Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights ("Accord"). 7 The Accord purported to correct the enforcement problems
which plagued the 1992 agreement.8 However, serious enforcement problems
remained as piracy in China continued to increase despite the Accord?
Again, on June 17, 1996, Acting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky and People's Republic of China President Jiang Zemin negotiated The
Agreement on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights ("1996 Agreement"), 10
2. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., UNITED STATES AND CHINA
REACH ACCORD ON PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKET ACCESS 4 (Feb. 26, 1995)
(USTR Fax Retrieval System); see infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
3. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 4.
4. Kahn & Cooper, supra note I. To some commentators, gaining U.S. support for entrance into the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") is a significant factor in China's decisions to comply with U.S. demands
for increased intellectual property enforcement. Simpson, supra note 1, at 579 n.20. But WTO considerations
are beyond the scope of this article.
5. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at I (announcing that China's enforcement of
intellectual property rights is necessary to protect U.S. companies and to provide market access for U.S.
products).
6. See Edward J. Fitzpatrick et al., Licensing in Asia, in PLI INTE.LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW lNsTrrtE
1027, 1028 (1995) (stating that U.S. investment in China in 1994 was estimated at $34 billion); OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 1 (proclaiming that China's intellectual property enforcement is necessary
to provide market access for intellectual property-based products).
7. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 1.
8. Id.; see infra notes 83-165 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 166-97 and accompanying text.
10. Charlene Barshefsky, Statement by Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky on Trade Talks with China
on Intellectual Property Rights, INT'LTRADEREP. 1036,1036 (June 19,1996).
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narrowly averting trade sanctions which were threatened by both countries. The
terms of the 1996 Agreement continued the terms of the 1995 Accord 12 by merely
augmenting some of the enforcement provisions of the Accord.3
This comment provides a historic overview of intellectual property rights in
China, summarizes both the Accord and the 1996 Agreement, describes the
effects of the measures implemented as a result of the Accord, and discusses the
impact of the Accord on intellectual property rights protection in developing
Chinese markets. Part H reviews the philosophical basis of China's approach to
intellectual property protection and why it fosters piracy. 4 Part HI explores
previous efforts to solve the problem of Chinese piracy.15 Part IV discusses the
Accord, including immediate steps to address piracy, long-term changes to ensure
effective enforcement, and enhanced access to the Chinese market for U.S. right
holders. 6 Part V examines the efforts of the Chinese government to implement
the Accord.17 Part VI analyzes the 1996 Agreement. 8 Part VII concludes with a
critical examination of the intellectual property right enforcement situation in
China since the Accord.19
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION: WHY IT FOSTERS PIRACY
The source of friction between the United States and China on protection of
intellectual property stems from the different histories of the two countries in
recognizing those rightsmt and from the different perspectives the countries have
based on their respective levels of economic development.2? ' The United States
has placed a premium on protecting intellectual property rights for over two hun-
dred years, as evidenced by the framers' inclusion of those rights in the Con-
11. Kathy Chen & Helene Cooper, U.S. and China Reach an Agreement, Averting Trade Sanctions by
Both Sides, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A2.
12. Id.; see William P. Alford, A Piracy Deal Doesn't Make a China Policy, WALLST.J., July 17, 1996,
at A14 (stating the 1996 Agreement's "measures echo last year's U.S.-China intellectual property agreement").
13. See infra notes 202-23 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 83-165 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 202-25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
20. Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Problem and Suggestions for
Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 599, 601 (1995).
21. See Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 330 (1993) (explaining and contrasting the perspectives of intellectual
property held by the developed and developing worlds); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States
Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 373 (1991) (describing
the schism between the West and the developing world in their respective attitudes toward the protection of
intellectual property).
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stitution.2 China, on the other hand, has consistently recognized intellectual
property rights only in the last twenty years?3
Modem Chinese intellectual property protection only dates back to the late
1970s.24 The Qing Dynasty enacted copyright protection beginning in 1910,25 but
those laws were destroyed by the Chinese C6mmunist Party in 1949.26 When the
People's Republic of China was established in 1949, all property, including
intellectual property, became collectively owned by the state in accordance with
communist doctrine, thus rendering copyright protection irrelevant? 7
Following communist leader Mao Zedong's death in 1976, China's new
leaders decided once again to recognize limited private property rights as a means
to accelerate economic growth.28 The new leaders, headed by Chairman Deng
Xiaoping, believed increased application of modem technology to all sectors of
the economy was needed for China to reach economic equality with the West. 9
During the 1980s, China modified its Marxist economy" in favor of a dual
system consisting of a one-party autocratic political system and a government-
assisted free market economy.31 This shift in economics reflects not an adoption
of capitalism, but rather a return to Confucianism; the traditional philosophy of
China3 2 Where capitalism supports self-gain independent of societal gain,
Confucianism allows the opportunity for self-gain only if it primarily helps
society as a whole3 3 China began to enact intellectual property laws consistent
with its efforts to restructure its economic system by recognizing private property
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries").
23. Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 602.
24. Id.
25. Simpson, supra note 1, at 582.
26. Id.
27. See Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 603-04 (explaining that communists believe property should be
collectively owned by the state to eliminate class inequities).
28. Id. at 604; see Laurence P. Harrington, Recent Amendments to China's Patent Law: The Emperor's
New Clothes, 17 B.C. INT'L & Comp,. L. REv. 337,345 (1994) (stating that Chinese leaders of the late 1970s
and early 1980s, "clearly recognized the utility of intellectual property protection as an incentive for economic
development"); see also Guo Shoukang, China, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGr LAW AND PRACICE, § 1 [2] [b]
(Paul E. Geller ed., 1993) (stating that in the late 1970s, China adopted a new policy of reform including
opening to the outside world).
29. Simpson, supra note I, at 585. "West," as used in this comment, refers to developed, industrialized
countries.
30. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 730 (1991) (defining "Marxism" as the
political, economic, and social principles advocated by Marx, especially the practice of communism and the
dictatorship of the proletariat until the establishment of a classless society).
31. Simpson, supra note 1, at 585.
32. See J.P. ERRico, LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK 59-65 (1995) (contrasting Marxism, Capitalism, and
Confucianism and how these philosophies relate to Chinese patent law).
33. Id.
590
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rights.a' The People's Republic of China enacted its trademark law in 1983,35 its
patent law in 1985,36 and its copyright law in 1990.37
The development of Chinese intellectual property law is recent, thus the
concept that copying is improper has yet to fully develop as a part of the Chinese
culture.38 For example, in China, the greatest compliment that authors can receive
is having someone copy their works.3 9 This unique aspect of Chinese culture
makes enforcing intellectual property rights more difficult.
40
In addition, China shares with other developing countries certain disin-
centives to vigorous enforcement of intellectual property rights.41 Developing
nations typically view intellectual property rights as a restriction on their ability
to obtain and use technological information necessary for their economic develop-
ment.42 Many developing nations argue that technological information should be
easily accessible and provided at a minimal cost because knowledge is the
common heritage of mankind and because Third World development is in the
interest of all nations.43 They view the importation of intellectual property as the
Developed World's means of dominating and exploiting developing countries and
the payment of royalties as fostering a negative balance of trade.
44
Developing countries see piracy as the natural marketplace response to high
prices, as well as a practical means of obtaining necessary technology. 45 In the
34. Simpson, supra note 1, at 585.
35. TRADEMARKLAWOFTHEPEOPLE'S REPUBLICOFCHINA (adopted by the 5th Nat'l People's Cong.,-
24th Sess. of the Standing Comm., Aug. 23, 1982), translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, China
Trade Documents 11-500 (CCH Australia 1989); see Harrington, supra note 29, at 346 (stating that the 1982
Trademark Law, adopted in 1983, was the first law protecting intellectual property after 1976).
36. PATENTLAWOFTHEPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OFCHINA (adopted by the 6th Nat'l People's Cong., 4th
Sess. of the Standing Comm., March 12, 1984), translated by Chinalaw Computer-Assisted Legal Research
Center, Peking University (LEXIS, Chinalaw, No. 190).
37. Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 604; see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO
PUBLICATION No. 616 (E), COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAWS AND TREATIES, China: Text 2-201,
at I (1993) (translating China's copyright law of September 7, 1990); Shoukang, supra note 29, §1 (stating that
the People's Republic of China's first copyright statute was the Copyright Act of September 7, 1990, which
went into effect on June 1, 1991).
38. Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 605.
39. Id.
40. See id. (explaining that due to the incomplete understanding of intellectual property by the Chinese
population, the concept that copying is "wrong" is not a part of Chinese culture).
41. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 275; see Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 330-31 (describing the
perspective of the developing world on intellectual property).
42. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; see Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 330-31 (describing the major
benefits developing nations gain from allowing piracy); ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 28,28 (1987) (labeling problems related to enforcement of
traditional intellectual property rights or existing intellectual property laws and institutions as "Old Issues,"
and describing the philosophical and practical differences between industrialized nations and the developing
world).
43. Benko, supra note 43, at 28.
44. Id.
45. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331,341.
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short run, pirates enrich themselves and the country in which they operate." For
example, pirates incur minimal production costs by not having to fund research
and development for the products they copy.47 Furthermore, they make no royalty
payments and avoid marketing failures by copying only successful products ! 8
Therefore, pirates are in a better position than legitimate producers to satisfy
demands in developing countries. 49
Developing countries tend to have limited financial and law enforcement
resources which are largely consumed by other, higher-priority problems such as
poverty and violent crime. Consequently, few if any resources are allocated to
enforcement of intellectual property rights. t Developing countries seldom have
lobbies of inventors, authors, or companies who would benefit from stricter intel-
lectual property right enforcement, therefore, governments in these countries feel
little internal pressure to enforce intellectual property rights 2
In contrast, developed countries, such as the United States, have a much
different perspective on intellectual property right enforcement, and they typically
have greater financial and law enforcement resources relative to their problems.53
Information is a valuable commodity and a major component of national in-
come.54 Inadequate protection undermines the goal of free trade and prevents
creators from recovering their research and development costs, thereby
diminishing the economic incentives necessary for future technological
innovation."
In theory, China's laws protecting intellectual property rights provide
adequate copyright and trademark protection. 6 The problem has been the incon-
sistent and seemingly reluctant enforcement of those laws by the Chinese govern-
ment.57 The reluctance is a result of China's cultural and economic disincentives
46. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; see Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331 (listing reasons for
developing countries' nonrecognition of intellectual property rights).
47. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331.
48. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331.
49. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331.
50. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 282.
51. Id.
52. Id.; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 331.
53. Benko, supra note 43, at 28; see Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 330-32 (noting factors
motivating developed countries to demand intellectual property protection); Leaffer, supra note 22 (discussing
the different perspectives of developed and developing countries regarding intellectual property).
54. Benko, supra note 43, at 28; Leaffer, supra note 22, at 275; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 332;
see J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property: America's Overlooked Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809,
__ (1995) (stating that if foreign nations do not recognize or enforce intellectual property laws, then America
has nothing to sell).
55. Benko, supra note 43, at 28; Leaffer, supra note 22, at 277; Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 332.
56. See John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, 21
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 88 (1995) (declaring that even U.S. officials admit China's intellectual property laws are
adequate).
57. Id.
1996/Copyright and Trademark Enforcement in China
to intellectual property right enforcement 8 In the past, when the United States
threatened trade sanctions in retaliation for Chinese piracy, China made several
well-publicized raids, pledged to protect intellectual property rights and pro-
claimed the problem solved! 9 However, after the United States dropped its
threats, Chinese piracy continued at its previous pace.'
I1. EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PIRACY IN CHINA
In 1991, the United States named China a Priority Foreign Country pursuant
to Special 30161 due to China's failure to provide adequate patent and copyright
protection, especially in the area of computer software.62 Lengthy negotiations
resulted in the signing of an agreement ("Memorandum of Understanding") just
hours before U.S. retaliatory measures were to be implemented. 63 The Memo-
randum of Understanding, entered into on January 17, 1992, was the first mile-
stone in U.S. efforts to encourage China to enforce intellectual property rights. 64
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, China changed its legal
system by adopting many of the intellectual property laws and regulations of
western countries and by establishing special tribunals, such as the Intellectual
Property Court, to handle cases under the new legislation. 65 Later that same year,
58. See supra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
59. Id.
6.0. Id.
61. See Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, 29 INT'L LAw. 15, 23-
25 (1995) (explaining that Special 301 is a provision Congress added to Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act).
Section 301 is the principal statutory authority under which the President, through the USTR, may impose
retaliatory trade sanctions against countries whose unfair trade policies or practices adversely affect U.S. trade
interests. Id. Special 301 is targeted specifically at protecting U.S. intellectual property rights, requiring the
USTR annually to identify countries failing to provide adequate and effective protection to U.S. intellectual
property rights and to investigate that country under Section 301 with shorter deadlines for investigation and
any subsequent determination to retaliate. Id; see Newby, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that China was one of the
first three countries to be named a Priority Foreign Country, the highest level of priority named by the USTR).
62. Newby, supra note 6, at 31.
63. Id.
64. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 2.
65. Simpson, supra note 1, at 577. Specific changes China made pursuant to the Memorandum of
Understanding included: extending patent protection to include all chemical inventions, setting the term of
patent protection to twenty years from the date of filing the patent application, acceding to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"), acceding to the
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms ("Geneva Convention"), issuing new regulations to comply with the Berne Convention and
Geneva Convention, agreeing to recognize and protect computer programs as literary works under the Berne
Convention and providing protection for a term of fifty years, protecting all works originating in a member of
the Berne Union that are not in the public domain in their country of origin, and protecting trade secrets for
as long as the conditions for protection are met. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 2.
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the United States rewarded China for its progress by moving it to the Watch List,
the lowest level of priority named by the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR").6
Despite the progress in legislation, widespread piracy of U.S. products
continued due to lackluster enforcement by the Chinese government. 7 Only a
fraction of the intellectual property violations within China were tried in Chinese
courts.68 Furthermore, the claims that were tried had low success rates, and
plaintiffs that were successful did not receive adequate or just awards.69 In large
part, this was due to the fact that pirates had a chance to destroy erucial evidence
because Chinese authorities delayed in responding to allegations of piracy with
sweeps of infringing stores, factories, and distribution centers. 70 Because of the
continued lack of enforcement, the USTR once again upgraded China from the
Watch List to the Priority Watch List on November 30, 1993.!'
Realizing that greater enforcement was needed to appease the USTR, Chinese
officials increased their efforts to enforce intellectual property laws. In 1994,
they confiscated over 2.2 million pirated laser discs and uncovered about 140,000
cases of trademark violations! 2 However, this success only affected a small
portion of the Chinese pirating industry.
73
Estimated losses for U.S. industries in China due to copyright infringements
for 1993 were $415 million, with software companies alone losing $225 million.74
In 1994, the total estimated losses due to Chinese copyright infringement were
over $800 million.75 In 1995, estimated losses due to Chinese piracy climbed to
66. See Newby,'supra note 6, at 43 (noting that China was one of eighteen Watch List countries in
1992).
67., Simpson, supra note 1, at 577; see Newby, supra note 6, at 31 (estimating U.S. losses in China due
to copyright infringement for 1993 at $415 million); John M. Vassiliades, Protection of Copyright and
Trademark Rights in China, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 1995 MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION
313, 317 (Siegrun D. Kane & Mark A. Steiner eds., 1995) (reporting that the Chinese government admitted
that 95% of the CDs manufacture in China in 1994 were illegally copied and distributed). According to the
Software Publishing Association, China's piracy rate of computer software was 98% in 1994, and "only one
dollar [is] spent on software for every computer system purchased. Id. at 316-17.
68. See Simpson, supra note 1, at 604 (stating that the August 3, 1994, Beijing Intermediate Court
ruling in favor of Walt Disney Co. against a prominent Beijing children's book publisher was one of only
twenty civil cases filed in two years to receive a judgment).
69. See Vassiliades, supra note 68, at 329 (stating that damage awards against Chinese defendants have
been extremely low). Recent judgments include a Chinese electronics company found liable for pirating Sega
Enterprises' video games fined only $3000, a $22 million copyright suit brought by Microsoft resulted in only
$2500 in damages, and successful trademark infringement actions filed by Disney and Microsoft resulted in
damage awards of $91 and $2600, respectively. Id.
70. Simpson, supra note 1, at 610 n.273.
71. Newby, supra note 6, at 41-42.
72. United States and China Sign Accord to End Piracy, 7 NO. 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 35 (1995)
[hereinafter Sign Accord].
73. Id. 2.2 million disks valued at $10 each is $22 million, which is less than 3% of the total estimated
losses in 1994 of $800 million. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
74. Newby, supra note 6, at 30.
75. Id. at 31.
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$1.84 billion, with business software losses accounting for $250 million of that
total. 6
On June 30, 1994, due to the continued lack of satisfactory progress in
enforcement measures, the USTR initiated a Special 301 investigation against
China after placing China back on the list of Priority Foreign Countries."7 The
United States threatened trade sanctions on more than $1 billion worth of Chinese
products pursuant to Special 301.78 China threatened similar trade sanctions of its
own in retaliation.79
On February 26, 1995, as the deadline approached for Special 301 trade
sanctions against China to go into effect, the United States and China signed the
Accord ending the impending threat of a trade war.80 The Accord outlined the
steps that the Chinese government was to take immediately to curb the wide-
spread piracy of U.S. products and eventually to ensure continued effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights.81
IV. THE 1995 U.S./CHINA ACCORD ON PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Accord represents the Chinese government's promise to begin enforcing
its intellectual property laws.82 China already had adequate intellectual property
laws, but the enforcement of those laws was woefully inadequate.83 The Accord
outlined specific enforcement procedures which would ensure effective intel-
lectual property right enforcement in China.84 In general terms, the Accord
contained the following commitments: First, China was to take immediate anti-
piracy steps, including creating task forces for an immediate crackdown to collect
evidence and conduct expansive search-and-destroy raids on pirating factories; 5
Second, China was to implement long-term changes to ensure continued effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights including: establishing a customs
service modeled after the U.S. Customs Service to stop the exportation of pirated
goods,86 training Chinese business and legal professionals regarding intellectual
76. See Marcus W. Brauchli, China Could Face U.S. Trade Sanctions Of Over $2 Billion Due to Piracy
Loses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at A9 (using estimates from the International Intellectual Property Alliance
on total losses and from the Software Publishers' Association for estimated software losses).
77. Simpson, supra note 1, at 31; Newby, supra note 6, at 43.
78. Newby, supra note 6, at 43; Sign Accord, supra note 73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text
(explaining Special 301).
79. Newby, supra note 6, at 43.
80. OFFICE OFTHE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 1; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 31.
81. OFFICEOFTHErU.S.TRADEREP.,supra note 2, at 5-6; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 31.
82. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 3.
83. Gero & Lannan, supra note 57, at 88.
84. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at2; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
85. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 2; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
86. OFFCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 2; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
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property rights, 87 affording U.S. citizens and companies easier access to Chinese
courts for intellectual property claims,88 and establishing a new system for
exchanging intellectual property enforcement statistics with the United States;89
Lastly, China was to provide U.S. right holders with enhanced access to the
Chinese markets by lifting all quotas on U.S. audio-visual goods and allowing
joint ventures for audio and audio-visual productions.90 These measures are
reviewed in turn.9'
A. Immediate Steps to Address Rampant Piracy Throughout China
The Accord promised a special enforcement period during which enhanced
resources were to be allocated to investigating and prosecuting large-scale pro-
ducers and distributors of infringing products.92 The special enforcement period
was to begin on March 1, 1995, and run for six months,93 The State Council's
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights ("Council") was to be
created to direct and coordinate the increased enforcement efforts during this
period to ensure the elimination of piracy and to launch a nation-wide information
and education campaign on intellectual property rights.94 Particular emphasis was
to be placed on regions with high levels of infringement activity with a focus on
prosecuting some significant cases, imposing severe penalties and publicizing the
penalties to deter further infringements 5 Investigation was to focus on areas
where pirated products were produced, distributed, and sold,96 with efforts
primarily to be directed at audio-visual products, computer software, books,
sound recordings, and infringement of well-known trademarks.97 China promised
to allocate adequate resources to effectively take action against factories pro-
ducing pirated products and to prohibit the exportation of pirated products! 8
The Accord placed special emphasis on enforcement against Chinese
factories producing pirated compact disks (CDs), laser disks (LDs), or coinpact
disks with read-only memory (CD-ROMs). 99 Each such factory was to be
87. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 3; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
88. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 3; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
89. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 3; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
90. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 3; Sign Accord, supra note 73, at 35.
91. See infra notes 93-165 and accompanying text.
92. CHINA'S SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, ACTION PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs, Feb. 26, 1995, § I, C [hereinafter ACTION PLAN]; OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REP., supra note 2, at 2.
93. Accord, supra note 93, § I, C, 1.
94. Id. § 1, C, 1-2.
95. Id. § I, C, 3-4.
96. Id. § 1, C, 4.
97. Id.
98. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
99. Accord, supra note 93, § 1, D, 1.
596
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investigated, without prior notice, by July 1, 1995, to determine whether they
were, or had been, producing unauthorized disks.'00 Factories found to have en-
gaged in infringement were to be punished through seizure, forfeiture, and
destruction of the pirated products and the materials and implements directly and
predominantly used to make them.101
B. Long-term Changes to Ensure Effective Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights
In addition to the immediate protection provided in the 1995 Accord, and
China's promise to enforce its intellectual property laws "strictly,"' 02 China
promised to take the following steps to ensure that intellectual property rights
would be respected and enforced in the future as well. 03
1. State Council's Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights
The Accord charged the Council with overseeing long-term (three to five
years) sustained enforcement.14 China promised to establish a strong intellectual
property enforcement scheme comprised of Intellectual Property Rights Working
Conferences ("Working Conferences") to coordinate enforcement efforts and the
drafting and implementation of legislation and regulation.'05 The Accord provided
that each Working Conference would have an enforcement task force, empowered
and directed to carry out enforcement efforts with respect to all types of intel-
lectual property.'1 6
The Accord described the Council's role as ensuring that cross-jurisdictional
enforcement efforts are carried out cooperatively and effectively between and
among all Working Conferences.0 7 In fulfilling its role, the Council must
coordinate, study, and decide major policies and enforcement measures for intel-
lectual property protection, and organize, instruct, and monitor all departments
of the relevant authorities in each region that are charged with implementation. 108
100. Id. § I, C,4 & D, 1, a.
101. Id. § I, D, 1, b.
102. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Accord, supra note 93, annex I. The State Council's WorkingConference on Intellectual Property
Rights is comprised of the State Council's departments in charge of science, technology, foreign trade and
economic cooperation, foreign affairs, press and publication, culture, broadcast, film, television, justice, public
security, patent, copyright, industrial and commercial administration, and customs, and the departments in
charge of the relevant industries. Id. § 1, A, 2.
105. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2; see Accord, supra note 93, § I, A, 1-3 (stating that
China was to create Working Conferences at the central, provincial, and local levels).
106. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
107. Accord, supra note 93, § 1, A, 3; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
108. Accord, supra note 93, § 1, A, 3.
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Additionally, the Council must instruct and organize the relevant authorities to
provide education and publicity for the laws regarding intellectual property
rights. 9 All Working Conferences are required to issue follow-up reports each
quarter for the first year, and semi-annually thereafter, beginning June 1, 1995.110
The authorities responsible for intellectual property protection were to
coordinate their activities under the Working Conferences and to participate in
enforcement task forces.' The task forces were to have all the personnel,
financial resources, and legal authority necessary to effectively enforce intel-
lectual property rights."2 The Accord provided that when there is reason to
believe or suspect that a company is engaging in copyright or trademark infringe-
ment, a task force may enter and search any premises, review books and records
for evidence of infringement and damages, and seize suspected goods and the
materials and implements directly and predominantly used to make them. "'When
an intellectual property violation is found, the task force is authorized to impose
fines, order an end to production and sale, revoke business permits, and cause the
forfeiture and destruction of the pirated goods and the implements and materials
predominantly used to make them."14 Working Conferences and enforcement task
forces were to investigate and punish trademark infringement "promptly and
strictly" and then turn cases over to prosecutors who were to "seek severe
penalties."'"
5
2. Customs Enforcement
In addition to the creation of task forces and Working Conferences discussed
above, China was to create an effective customs enforcement system modeled
after the U.S. Customs Service by October 1, 1995.216 The Chinese Customs
Service ("Customs") was to publish regulations clarifying to the public that the
import or export of pirated goods is illegal.' '7 Customs was to exercise all of the
authority conferred by China's customs law including the authority to examine
all types of imports and exports based on suspicion of infringement, based on the
109. Id. § 1, A, 3.
110. Id.§IA, 5, c.
Ill. Id. § L, B. I.
112. Id. § I, B, 1, a.
113. Id. § I, B, 1,b.
114. Id. § I, B, 1, c.
115. Id. § I, D, 4, a. In addition to the punishment the task forces may inflict, judicial penalties for
copyright or trademark violation may include, compensating right holders for losses suffered, eliminating the
effects of infringement including making a public apology, punitive damages of two to five times the value of
the infringing copies or goods, and criminal charges as may be appropriate under the Criminal Code of the
People's Republic of China. Shoukang, supra note 29, §8[5]; TRADEMARK LAW OFTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLtC
OF CHINA, supra note 36, art. 40.
116. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2; Accord, supra note 93, § 1, G, 2.
117. Accord, supra note 93, § I, G, 2.
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petition of the right holder or his or her representative, or at random.'1 8 Customs
also was to enforce copyrights1 9 and trademarks' 20 against infringing imports and
exports.12 1 When Customs detained goods thought to be pirated, the right holder
was to post a bond in an amount equal'to the value of the goods, and if the final
determination as to infringement was negative, the importer or exporter could
request relief for losses incurred.'2 Within ten days of goods being detained,
Customs was to begin an investigation as to the legitimacy of the goods. 123Within
twenty days, Customs was to notify prosecutors, police, and other relevant
authorities in cases involving suspected criminal activity.'24 Customs officials
were to seize and destroy infringing articles, except in cases of trademark
violation where the mark can be removed or obliterated; such goods will be kept
out of the stream of commerce and can be used only for charity, government
agencies, or auctioned to someone other than the infringer. 12 Parties dissatisfied
with decisions made by Customs could seek administrative reconsideration or
judicial proceedings.'26
3. Central Recordation
The Accord provided for Chinese customs to establish a central recordation
system to aid in protecting copyright and trademark rights. 27 The system was to
contain information on suspected or known infringers including the means of
identifying specific infringing merchandise, the location and time of anticipated
importation or exportation, and the suspected destinations of exported goods.'2
Customs was to continuously update the information and disseminate it to all
customs offices. 29
China was to establish a copyright verification system to help prevent the
production, distribution, exportation, and retail sale of audio-visual works, CDs,
118. Id.
119. Customs will enforce copyrights against infringing goods in all cases in which the applicant for
enforcement presents legal proof of copyright, which in the case of a national of a member of the Berne
Convention would be satisfied by a copyright registration certificate of that member country. Id.
120. Customs enforces trademarks in all cases in which the applicant for enforcement presents a
'Trademark Registration Certificate" issued by the AIC (China's primary administrative law enforcement
department for trademark infringement - id. § 1. E, I, b) or a claim of well-known status confirmed by the AIC.
Id. § I, G, 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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LDs, and CD-ROMs without the verified consent of the right holder. 30 To help
implement this system, all manufacturers of CDs, LDs, and CD-ROMs were to
be issued a unique identifier that must be imprinted on manufactured copies in an
obvious place. 31 Disk manufacturers were to maintain a copy of the license
contract and certificate of registration, together with an example of the copies
produced, during production and for three years thereafter.
32
The Accord required registration of contracts with, and title registration from,
China's National Copyright Administration ("NCA") 33 for all producers, repro-
ducers, and publishers of foreign audio-visual products and CD-ROMs. 34 The
NCA was to forward documents purporting to authorize production to the
relevant associations of right owners, and issue a certificate of title registration
only upon verification from theassociation. 5 Associations of U.S. right holders
were to be allowed to establish offices in China to participate in this system.
36
The Accord provided that all software retailers were to be required to main-
tain an accurate inventory, including type, origin, quantity, and location, of any
software it commercially reproduces, distributes, or rents, and to update and
verify the accuracy of the inventory regularly. 37 Software retailers were to
possess licenses to operate; all software distributed by entities lacking a license
were to be treated as illegal, forfeited, and destroyed. 38 Repeat offenders were to
lose their licenses for a minimum of three years. 39
The Accord was to protect copyrights on books, periodicals, and other printed
works by stating that supervision and monitoring of distribution were to be im-
proved, and that business licenses of those entities printing pirated material were
to be revoked without mercy.140 Publishers must check with the license issuing
agency to verify the printing license before printing books or periodicals.' 4' Pub-
lishing licenses were to be granted based on whether the applicant has obtained
130. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2; see Accord, supra note 93, § I, H.
131. Accord, supra note 93, § I, H, 1, a.
132. Id. § I, H, 3.
133. The State Council approved the establishment of the National Copyright Administration of China
in 1985. Shoukang, supra note 29, §1[2][b]. The NCA's main responsibilities are drafting copyright legislation,
overall administration of copyright, collection and dissemination of copyright knowledge, and handling
external copyright relations on behalf of the government. Id. Also, where a legal provision allows a use without
the consent of the copyright owner, but requirei that remuneration be paid, the NCA establishes the rates of
remuneration for the exploitation. Id. §5[2][a].
134. Accord, supra note 93, § I, H, 2.
135. Id. § I, H, 2, b. The issuance of a registration certificate will in no way preclude a later action for
infringement. Id.
136. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
137. Accord, supra note 93, § 1, D, 2, b, ii.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. § I, D, 3, a.
141. Id. § I, D, 3, b.
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authorization from the right holder to publish the material, and printing houses
operating without a license will be shut down. 42
4. Effective Judicial Relief
Under the Accord, China was to ensure that U.S. right holders have access
to effective judicial relief.1 43 This includes giving "national treatment'" 44 for civil
filing fees, expeditious handling of intellectual property cases involving
foreigners, and providing protection against destruction of evidence of infringe-
ment while a case is pending. 45 Also, China was to ensure the availability, or
"transparency,"' 146 of its laws, regulations, and rules related to the grant, main-
tenance, and enforcement of intellectual propert3 rights.' 47
5. Information Dissemination and Training
To facilitate enforcement, China was to enhance the training offered judges,
lawyers, students, government officials, and business persons on the nature of
intellectual property and the importance of its protection. 48 Within one to two
years, fifty percent of the officials at or above the county and departmental ranks,
and over eighty percent of persons in charge of research institutions, large and
medium-sized enterprises, and institutions of higher learning, as well as officials
in economics, science and technology, and culture management were to be trained
on intellectual property rights. 49 Institutes of higher learning were to open or
expand special studies of intellectual property and to provide basic intellectual
property education for undergraduates. 150 The Chinese media, including radio,
television, newspapers, and periodicals, was to systematically heighten the
awareness of intellectual property rights and laws in society as a whole by
142. Id.
143. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3.
144. National treatment means that the Chinese government may not discriminate against right holders
who are foreigners. See Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art.
5(l) (making national treatment a part of the Berne Convention). National treatment "means that the authors
of Union works, i.e. works protected by the [Berne] Convention, enjoy in all Union countries, other than in
the country of origin of the work, the same protection as nationals of that country in addition to the rights they
enjoy jure conventionis." STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 118
(1989).
145. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3.
146. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, art. 63 [hereinafter TRIPS] (elaborating on transparency as "laws and regulations, and final judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of general application.., shall be published or... made publicly available
... as to enable governments and right holders to become acquainted with them").
147. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3.
148. Id.
149. Accord, supra note 93, § If, A, 1.
150. Id. § II, A, 3.
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publicizing the consequences of infringements and giving wide coverage to
prosecutions of serious infringements.' 5'
The Accord provided that China was to protect against unauthorized use of
intellectual property products in China's government ministries, and that those
ministries were to be given adequate resources for the procurement of only
authorized, legitimate computer software. 52 Infringement of copyrighted software
was strictly banned, and each individual and entity, public or private, was to be
treated equally under the law; for example, China was to prosecute infringers
whether they had political influence or not. 5
3
6. Exchange of Enforcement Statistics
The Accord established a system whereby the Chinese and the U.S.
governments have begun to exchange statistics concerning enforcement efforts.'54
Information exchange began on a quarterly basis June 1, 1995, then semi-
annually for two years beginning January 1, 1996, and is to be on a schedule to
be agreed upon thereafter.'55 China is to provide information and statistics on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights of U.S. nationals and joint ventures
involving U.S. nationals. t6 Likewise, the United States is to provide information
on federal intellectual property enforcement and statistics on Chinese products
that are infringed in the United States. 57
C. Providing U.S. Right Holders with Enhanced Access to the Chinese
Market
The 1995 Accord includes a commitment from China to abolish all quotas on
the importation of U.S. audio-visual products.5 8 This includes allowing U.S.
record companies to market their entire catalog of works, subject to censorship
concerns. 5 9 China promised to allow U.S. intellectual property related companies
to enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies for the production, repro-
151. Id. § II, B.
152. Id. § I, D, 2, b, iii; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
153. Accord, supra note 93, § 1, D, 2, b.
154. Id.
155. U.S. Trade Rep. Michael Kantor letter to Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation
Wu Yi, 4 (Feb. 26, 1995) (USTR Fax Retrieval System) [hereinafter USTR Letter].
156. Id. at 4-5. The information is to be provided by type of intellectual property, establishments raided,
value and disposition of infringing products, machinery, and implements, and on prosecutions and
administrative and court decisions. Id.
157. Id. at 5. The United States is to report the customs seizure value of infringing goods by commodity
and by type of intellectual property right, as well as seizure quantities by commodity, and information on
prosecutions and court decisions in intellectual property cases. Id.
158. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3; USTR Letter, supra note 156, at 3.
159. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3; USTR Letter, supra note 156, at 3.
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duction, distribution, and sale of U.S. audio-visual products in China.160 Joint
ventures initially may establish operations in Shanghai and Guangzhou, and
China promised to allow expansion to eleven other as yet undetermined cities by
the year 2000.161
Trademark agents permitted to represent Chinese individuals and entities
were to be permitted to represent foreigners.162 Foreign subsidiaries, joint ven-
tures, and licensees in China were to be permitted to act on behalf of the foreign
owners of their marks.163 These measures were to simplify access- to China's
trademark enforcement process for U.S. and other foreign trademark holders.' 4
V. EFFECTS OFTHE 1995 ACCORD
Some experts were quick to conclude that the initial results of the Accord
were promising,1 6' but others were not so optimistic.'66 In July 1995, the Chinese
government announced that its fight against intellectual property rights violations
had been a success and cited some impressive statistics to support its claim. 67
During the first four months of 1995, only two intellectual property rights
violations cases were reported to the Beijing Public Notary Office, compared with
two hundred cases reported in the same period in 1994.168 Intellectual property
rights violation suits in the Intellectual Property Court of the Beijing First Inter-
mediate People's Court decreased by thirty percent for the first three months of
1995 as compared to the same period in 1994.269 Of the suits filed in the Intel-
lectual Property Court in 1995, approximately twenty percent involve litigation
by foreign firms, including Microsoft and Walt Disney.170 China claims that these
changes are due to its successful fight against intellectual property rights
violations.17'
The task forces created as result of the 1995 agreement claimed to have
closed seven of the twenty-nine Chinese factories that produce pirated CDs and
160. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3; USTR Letter, supra note 156, at 3.
161. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 3; USTR Letter, supra note 156, at 3.
162. Accord, supra note 93, § I, D, 4, b.
163. Id.
164. See id. (stating that these provisions were designed for the purposes of obtaining enforcement
actions).
165. Dominic Bencivenga, Trade Pact with China: Enforcement Seen Key to Stamping Out Piracy, 213
N.Y.L. 5 (Mar. 2, 1995) (stating that the initial results of the 1995 agreement are encouraging, but time will
tell whether China is prepared to follow up words with action and enforce what they have agreed to do).
166. Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 600 (declaring that "the problem [of inadequate intellectual property
protection] has persisted and in all likelihood will not immediately disappear even with the new agreement").
167. China Claims Success in Enforcing IP Rights, 7 No. 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 24 (1995) [hereinafter
China Claims Success].
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Id.
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movie laser disks.172 However, sales of pirated computer software continued,
and U.S. software companies claimed that twenty-eight of the twenty-nine
Chinese pirate CD factories were still operating. 74
Microsoft Corporation, a large U.S. software manufacturer, complained in
October of 1995 that China's enforcement of intellectual property rights remained
erratic. 175 China's software market was about equal to that of France, but
Microsoft's revenues for China were only about three percent of the total for
French sales. 76 United States Customs agents seized a Chinese shipment of
pirated Microsoft software bound for U.S. stores valued at tens of millions of
U.S. dollars."7 Despite the continued problems, Microsoft was optimistic,
predicting its China revenues would rise to half the level of its France revenues
within three years and asserted it was not about to give up on the Chinese
software market.
78
Some Chinese CD pirates have turned to violence to protect their industry.'
79
In December 1995, after numerous threats, an employee of the anti-piracy unit of
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 8' was kidnaped by
thugs who announced that hit men had been contracted to halt the staffs
operations.18' The victim was returned unharmed, but the organization closed its
Guangzhou, China, office and sent its employees into hiding. 2 The threats had
increased after the group identified several CD factories as makers of porno-
graphic CD-ROMs." The penalty for pirating CDs in China is two to seven years
in prison, but the penalty for pornography can be execution.M Optimists see the
violence as a positive sign that the pirates, knowing the days are over when
intellectual property rights were not enforced, are desperate, since violence in
other countries signaled the last gasp of local mafia control. 5
172. Kachuriak, supra note 21, at 617.
173. Id. at 618.
174. Kahn & Cooper, supra note 1, at A10.
175. Craig S. Smith, Microsoft Says Pirate Copies Sap China Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1995,
available in WL [hereinafter Smith, Microsoft Says].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Maggie Farley, Peril Escalates for Team Fighting Piracy of CDs; China: an Office is Closed and
Staff Sent into Hiding after Colleague's Abduction, Death Threats, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1995, at D4.
180. The industry group represents 1,100 record producers in 70 countries and opened three offices in
China to monitor music bootlegging earlier this year. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting J.C. Giouw, Asian Regional Director of the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry).
185. Id.
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U.S. officials charged that China had not made serious efforts to comply with
the Accord, while China maintained it had made great progress.18 6 While
acknowledging that China had launched sporadic raids against offenders, U.S.
officials claimed the raids were directed at retailers and not at the plants pro-
ducing the goods.187 U.S. newspapers claimed that many managers of infringing
factories had strong local ties that protected them from closure and warned them
of impending raids, so factory raids were ineffective. 8
Addressing the specific provisions of the Accord, the USTR stated that China
did establish the State Council's Working Conference on Intellectual Property
Rights, China failed to create an effective customs enforcement system modeled
after the U.S. Customs Service by October 1, 1995, China did establish a central
recordation system for title verification, China failed to provide effective judicial
relief to foreign intellectual property right holders, China did make significant
efforts in information dissemination and training, China did exchange enforce-
ment statistics with the United States, and China failed to provide U.S. right
holders with enhanced access to the Chinese market by abolishing all quotas on
the importation of U.S. audio-visual products.'8 9
A year after the 1995 Accord, U.S. officials said that China had done very
little to perform its side of the bargain in shutting down pirate operations. t'°These
U.S. officials asserted: twenty-eight of the twenty-nine Chinese CD factories were
still producing infringing products at top speed,' 9' nine out of ten U.S.-origin
music recordings, computer software, videos, and books in Chinese markets were
pirated products,' 92 and production of pirated CDs in China had increased since
the Accord took effect. 93 The USTR maintained that China failed to attack
production and distribution of pirated products with any of the vigor to which it
186. Charles Abbott, U.S. Puts China Goods on Tentative Retaliation List, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Dec. 31, 1995.
187. Id. (citing the USTR).
188. E.g. Farley, supra note 180, at D4.
189. Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036.
190. David E. Sanger, U.S. to Apply New Vigor in Policing Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at D1;
Deadline Looms for China to Curb Copyright Piracy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Deadline
Looms] (quoting USTR Mickey Kantor saying China has not enforced the 1995 Accord); Barshefsky, supra
note 11, at 1036 (declaring that as of November, 1995, it was clear that China was not enforcing crucial
portions of the Accord).
191. See Sanger, supra note 191, at DI (stating that all twenty-nine factories are still operating at full
capacity); Farley, supra note 180, at D4 (stating that one of the twenty-nine CD factories remains closed); U.S.
'Very concerned' about China's progress in intellectual property rights, AFX NEWS, Dec. 18, 1995
[hereinafter Very Concerned] (quoting Deputy USTR Charlene Barshefsky that twenty-nine factories are still
producing large amounts of pirated material).
192. Abbott, supra note 187 (citing Eric Smith, president of the International Intellectual Property
Alliance).
193. See Farley, supra note 180, at D4; Craig S. Smith, U.S. Trade Officials Plan to Fault China On Its
LaxAntipiracy Steps, New Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1996, at A10 [hereinafter Officials Plan].
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committed in the Accord."9 China's customs enforcement remained inadequate,
and a series of customs regulations remained which did not conform with the
Accord, according to the USTR.195 From the U.S. perspective, the point of the
Accord was for China to enforce its intellectual property laws, but the Accord's
practical effect on Chinese piracy and on the enforcement'actions of the Chinese
government was negligible.'%
The USTR set a deadline of February 4, 1996, for China to increase enforce-
ment or face trade sanction of up to a one hundred percent punitive tariff on $2.8
billion worth of Chinese exports to the United States.'9 China immediately
threatened counter-retaliation including suspending talks on joint ventures with
major U.S. automobile manufacturers 98 The sanctions were in effect for only a
few hours before China once again promised greater enforcement of intellectual
property rights. t99 Thereafter, the USTR decided not to impose trade sanctions for
a few months.'
VI. THE 1996 U.S./CHINA AGREEMENT ON PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
In its 1996 report on the protection of U.S. intellectual property, the USTR
listed China alone in its "Priority Foreign Country" category for egregiously
inadequate protection of intellectual property, meaning China would be subject
to Special 301 sanctions once again.20' Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky threa-
tened Chinese officials with $2 billion in trade sanctions if China failed to make
progress by June 17, 1996, in shutting down pirate CD factories, increasing mar-
ket access for U.S. entertainment and publishing firms, and strengthening customs
controls.202
194. Very Concerned, supra note 192 (quoting Deputy USTR Barshefsky).
195. Id. (quoting Deputy USTR Barshefsky).
196. See supra notes 166-96 and accompanying text.
197. Abbott, supra note 187 (specifying that the preliminary list covers 23 tariff categories, including
$986 million in electronics, $600 million in wood and furniture, and $176 million in ceramics); Sanger, supra
note 191, at D1.
198. Abbott, supra note 187.
199. Brauchli, supra note 77, at A9.
200. Officials Plan, supra note 194, at AI0; see Deadline Looms, supra note 191, at A6 (stating that
USTR officials will delay trade sanctions against China at least until the Taiwan elections March 23).
201. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Sharply Attacks China Over Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J.,
May 1, 1996, at A3 (stating that the USTR report said China has "failed to stop illegal CD, video and CD-ROM
production, to prevent the export of infringing goods, or to honor its promise to grant market access for
legitimate audiovisual products").
202. Id.
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To avoid the sanctions, China called upon its national police, the powerful
Ministry of Public Security, to help fight piracy 03 Fifteen pirate CD factories
were closed, and Chinese officials seized 80,000 pirated CDs.?04 Barshefsky
found these enforcement efforts, combined with the Chinese government's pro-
mise to continue strictly enforcing its intellectual property laws, sufficient to
warrant dropping the threat of trade sanctions.25 The Chinese government's
promise to continue its strict enforcement is embodied in the 1996 U.S./China
Agreement on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights ("1996 Agreement").2°
The 1996 Agreement provides that China will begin a special enforcement
period, improve border enforcement, increase market access for U.S. companies,
and establish monitoring and verification systems.? The special enforcement
period is a focused enforcement effort on regions of rampant piracy.20 8
Essentially, it is a reinstatement of the special enforcement period provided for
in the Accord,2° with the additional involvement of China's Ministry of Public
Security and Ministry of Culture.2t0 The Ministry of Public Security is to make
piracy a centerpiece of its sweeping nationwide anti-crime campaign, thereby
adding tens of thousands of enforcement officials to the anti-piracy effort.2t
China is to improve its border enforcement to comply with the provisions of
the Accord.1 2 In particular, Chinese customs is to focus on exports of major
cargo shipments and the import of presses used to manufacture CDs.213 The
Chinese customs service is to cooperate with its regional and international
counterparts, including U.S. Customs.
214
Increased market access for U.S. companies is especially focused on Chinese
market access for legitimate U.S. audio-visual and computer software products. 215
The 1996 Agreement reiterates the provisions of the Accord in China's com-
mitments to allow U.S. record companies to enter into cooperative relationships
with Chinese publishing houses for signing artists and producing and distributing
the artists' works, to allow U.S. film companies the right to unlimited import of
films, and to allow U.S. film companies to enter into projects with Chinese
203. Chen & Cooper, supra note 12, at A2; see Barshefsky, supra note I I (stating that China's Ministry
of Public Security announced it will make intellectual property crimes a part of its newly announced
"Campaign Against Crime").
204. Chen & Cooper, supra note 12, at A2; Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036.
205. Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
210. Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036.
211. Id.
212. Id; see supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
213. Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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companies to co-produce motion pictures.216 Also echoing the Accord is the 1996
Agreement's provision reaffirming that Chinese public and private sector entities
will use only legitimate software.
217
The 1996 Agreement provides for monitoring and verification systems
designed to make China's intellectual property right protection system effective
over time.21 8 In order to ensure that the titles which Chinese CD factories and
publishing houses wish to produce are properly licensed, the validity of the
license must be checked with the appropriate U.S. trade association prior to
production.219 Any CD sold on the Chinese market without a SID code, the
"signature" that identifies which CD press produced a particular CD, will be
deemed per se illegal and subject to immediate seizure.221 China will station
inspectors in all CD factories twenty-four hours per day to check title verification
and the presence of SID codes on all molds and to audit CD press runs. 2To limit
the production capacity of potential pirates, China has prohibited the establish-
ment of any new CD plants and has prohibited the importation of CD presses and
equipment used in CD production lines unless expressly approved by the Chinese
government. 222
Most of these measures echo the Accord, and in the near future, they are
likely to be just as ineffective as the Accord. 23 Long-term effectiveness of
Chinese intellectual property enforcement will not be realized until there is a
strong domestic Chinese constituency for intellectual property. Increasing
criminalization is no substitute for regularity and predictability in the application
of a citizen-driven system of civil justice.2 24
VII. CONCLUSION
China may soon reach a stage in its development where it recognizes the
value of stronger intellectual property protectionYm If this change in perspective
216. Id; see supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
217. Barshefsky, supra note 11, at 1036; see supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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the 1996 Agreement centralize intellectual property right protection in the Chinese government which is
contrary to political and economic pluralism. Id.
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occurs, it will be the product of two Chinese concerns. First, foreign firms will
be reluctant to transfer technology to local companies, a necessary ingredient of
sustained growth, if enforcement remains inadequate.227 Second, as China's
economy grows, more local firms become piracy victims themselves, depressing
sales and employment and discouraging local research and development. 8
China's realization of the importance of intellectual property right enforcement
to its long term economic development bodes well for more effective enforcement
in the future.229
On the other hand, China is still a developing nation, so it has the
disincentives to vigorous intellectual property enforcement common among
developing countries.2 Promising strict enforcement keeps the flow of western
technology pouring into China, while continued piracy allows Chinese industry
to appropriate the technology it lacks without the associated research and
development costs, thereby enabling China to compete in modern technological
industries and avoid being dominated or exploited by developed countriesY t
For now, the pattern remains that the United States calls on China to remedy
its inadequate enforcement, China agrees to do so, then China breaks its pro-
mise 2 Such blatant disregard may undermine U.S. trade policy credibility
around the world if it goes unanswered. 3 However, history shows that China is
seldom swayed by outside pressures.3 4
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